The mass genocide which had occurred in the African country of Rwanda over a three-month course in 1994 was largely due to two factors: building tensions between the Tutsi and Hutu lineages for almost a century, and a failure by the international community to effectively respond to the crisis. It is estimated that, as a result of this tragic, internal strife between 400,000 and 800,000 Tutsi’s were slaughtered while an estimated two million fled the country to seek asylum in neighboring countries (Eriksson, 1996).
The response by the international community was, in relation to the genocide, quite slow, however efforts had already been underway for approximately two years to supply much needed food and medical supplies and services to the growing numbers of refugees by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Rwandese Red Cross, and United Nations World Food Program (WFP). Foreign aid during and immediately after the genocide was estimated to have been in excess of $1.4 billion with the bulk being provided by the United States and European Union (85 percent), while a significantly smaller percentage was provided through private sources (Eriksson, 1996). Approximately half of these expenditures were allocated to two United Nations (UN) agencies: the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the WFP. The remaining 50 percent was provided to a broad base of over 200 international nongovernmental groups (NGO), with the International Red Cross receiving the highest amount totaling 17 percent of such expenditures (Eriksson, 1996).
As may be imagined, foreign aid during the period when the Rwandan atrocities were occurring were expended towards the subsistence and medical needs of refugees and those displaced by the tragedy. However, aid for rebuilding the country appears to have begun less than a year afterward with $600 million in relief funds being donated through The United Nations Development Program (UNDP). Since then, Rwanda has enjoyed incremental increases in foreign aid combining for an estimated total of $5,064,210,000 over a ten-year period beginning in 1995 (Hakizimana & Endless, 2009). The results of this aid are a source of much contention throughout the international community primarily because a good portion of Rwanda’s economic surge over this period is due to its dependency on foreign aid (World Bank, 2014).
However, what does appear to be obvious is that the current official Rwandan administration has been responsible for a number of programs which reportedly are beneficial to citizens throughout the country. For example, according to Farmer, et al. (2009) the Rwandan government continues to develop health services since the end of the genocide, particularly since 2000 when grave health care inadequacies were brought to the fore. As a result, Rwanda is said to enjoy universal coverage estimated to have enrolled slightly over 90 percent of the population (Farmer, et al., 2009). What also seems apparent is that rehabilitation efforts after the genocide was kick-started by a $20 million grant provided by the World Bank and which was funneled through such organizations as the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the World Health Organization (WHO; Eriksson, 1996).
The major bulk of international aid since then, in the form of grants and loans, has been used for economic development. According to information provided by the World Bank “Rwanda’s long-term development goals are embedded in its Vision 2020 which seeks to transform Rwanda from a low-income agriculture-based economy to a knowledge-based, service-oriented economy with a middle-income country status by 2020.” (2014) This vision aims to transform four key areas: the economics of the country; rural development, productivity and youth employment.
Ultimately, the Rwandan government proposes to increase gross domestic product (GDP) through an increase of per capita income by $1000, however there appears to be no indication as to whether this increase is to take place on an annual basis (World Bank, 2014). The World Bank also claims that Rwanda has enjoyed a great deal of success in regards to development, which they measure through annual GDP, stated to average eight percent annually. As reported earlier, the question remains as to whether this growth can actually be attributed to economic development which has occurred over the last 14 years, or if it is the result of significant foreign aid which appears to comprise a significant portion of Rwanda’s economy (30-40 percent; World Bank, 2014). Hence, the challenge moving forward is to see just how robust and sustaining the Rwandan economy will be as foreign aid diminishes over time.
Perhaps the most glaring issue as it relates to Rwanda’s rehabilitation and economic growth has to do with equitability for its citizens. According to McDoom (2013), “Its critics point to the country’s poor performance in international measures of human rights compliance and political freedoms….” (To aid, or not to aid? The case of Rwanda.) The case of Rwanda appears to be quite thorny for governments and agencies bent upon provided the country with continued aid primarily because of its ongoing policy of discrimination toward those who are Tutsi, the minority group victimized by the majority of Hutus during the genocide. As Hakizimana & Endless (2009) report current aid provided to Rwanda flows to a government controlled by a small group of Tutsis who have earmarked much of the country’s aid, as well as the economic progress as a result, for the benefit of the majority of Tutsi, essentially leaving most Hutus out in the cold.
As a result, poverty in Rwanda remains extremely high and any gains that may be reported by organizations such as the World Bank could eventually be negligible because the country remains a center of ethnic turmoil and, as a result, factionalism (Hakizimana & Endless, 2009). It will be quite interesting to monitor events in Rwanda as they develop, hoping that economic progress within the country will not only reach sustainability but will also be spread throughout its people no matter their ethnicity.
References
Eriksson, J. (1996). The international response to conflict and genocide, lessons from the
Rwanda experience: Synthesis report. Copenhagen, dk: The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
Farmer, P. E., Nutt, C. T., Wagner, C. M., Sekabaraga, C., Nuthulaganti, T., Weigel, J. L., . . .Drobac, P.C. (2013). Reduced premature mortality in Rwanda: lessons from success. BMJ, 346(65), 1-7. Retrieved from DOI 10.1136/bmj.f65
Hakizimana, E., & Endless, B. (2009). Rwanda today: When foreign aid hurts more than it helps.
Chicago, IL: Hotel Rwanda Rusesabagina Foundation.
McDoom, O. S. (2013, April 29). To aid, or not to aid? The case of Rwanda. Retrieved
February 1, 2015, from http://unu.edu/publications/articles/to-aid-or-not-to-aid-the-case-of-rwanda.html
World Bank. (2014, October 22). Rwanda overview. Retrieved February 1, 2015, from http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/rwanda/overview
