I’ve chosen to review an article on International Intermodal Transportation (Shashikumar & Schatz, 2000). Specifically, this article is about whether and to what extent US regulatory decisions impact the broader context of international intermodal transportation. Intermodal transportation, generally, is the transportation of goods using more than one mode (hence intermodal) of transportation (Rodrigue, 2007). By way of example, intermodal transportation could involve the use of cargo ships to transport goods to the United States, followed by trains to transport goods from the coast to the heartlands, followed by cargo trucks to transport goods from the rail stations to warehouses. Intermodal transportation depends heavily on the phenomenon of “containerization,” the practice of using standardized cargo containers to transport goods in many different modes of transportation.

This article describes a number of issues that were emerging in 2000 regarding the efficiency of intermodal transportation, specifically rail-ocean transportation, in which goods enter and leave the United States by ship and are transported to and from the coast by rail (Shashikumar & Schatz, 2000, pp. 6–7). As the authors describe, rail transportation of cargo has been slow to develop in the United States in large part because rail operators could actually remain more profitable by clinging to the outdated and slower boxcar model than by updating. The United States declined to use regulation to force rail lines to modernize.

In fact, the government actually imposed tariffs that hindered rail-ocean agreements, scrutinized intermodal transportation agreements especially heavily, and (despite giving “superficial recognition” to the benefits of deregulation) imposed heavier and heavier regulations to the point that innovation was stifled. Beginning in 1994 and culminating with the OSRA of 1998, there was a movement to liberalize intermodal transportation regulation. The authors of this article analyzed empirically the approach of international firms to shipping agreements in the United States before and after the OSRA, finding that they were in many respects capable of overcoming the “legal and operational impediments in the US” (Shashikumar & Schatz, 2000). The authors also found cause for concern in the distrust that existed between rail carriers and ocean liner operators, and especially in the antitrust immunity that rail carriers had, which ocean liners tended to be uncomfortable with (because monopolies drive up prices, but of course rail carriers are a natural monopoly).

I was especially satisfied with how well the legal and historical analysis of intermodal transport fed into the empirical analysis of intermodal transport under then-current legal paradigms. It is very important, in my opinion, not to simply “prax it out” but instead to focus on how regulations have empirically affected world-class transportation firms. I also found the legal history to be especially useful as I grappled with this article; the discussion of the regulatory paradigm from the early 1900s onward gave me some time to catch my breath, as it were, and get a feel for the ways that the regulatory environment and the decisions of carriers interact.

There are two gaps to this article that I found concerning. The first is that the empirical analysis is on the lighter side of things. I would have preferred analysis that discussed the actual revenue and shipping expenditures of these world-class firms and how US regulations impacted those figures. In their place, this article focused on the subjective self-reports of stakeholders in areas like “what should an ocean carrier do to be successful” and “a wish list of changes to OSRA.” This is not the stuff of hard-hitting empirical analysis. It is better than just theorizing, but only just. The second gap is that there was no discussion of the sustainability of intermodal shipping or how regulations can be thoughtfully used to make intermodal shipping more efficient, which is an important emerging area (Colicchia, Creazza, & Dallari, 2017; Hou, 2017).

This is a moderately strong article. Although it does use empirical analysis of shipping firm behaviors, which is important, that empirical analysis is based on rather subjective and at times unhelpful data. Also, the legal historical analysis, while useful to provide context, is of less use today (18 years later) than empirical discussion would be, because patterns of firm organization change more slowly than the legal landscape. Even so, this article is a good starting point for someone who wants to understand the regulatory hurdles facing shipping firms.