In its intention to suppress migration flows, the US government wants to create a stable and effective law-enforcement process driven by the fundamental forces of capitalism. In such mechanism, for-profit detention companies such as GEO and CoreCivic, play a pivotal role. Their methods have much in common with slavery practice, but their motivation to keep profitability rates is strong enough for them to justify such practice. The US history contains enough proof that capitalism is not a perfect self-adjusting system that does not need government intervention. The situation with detention companies reflects the conflict of interest. Its solution lies in a compromise between all parties involved (namely the US government, US workers and taxpayers whose interests it protects, and immigrants) avoiding profit-preserving motivation of detention companies.
It would be incorrect to reject the importance of market forces in migration control policy. However, the effect of the market condition should be understood on the country level. The logic of those politicians who defend private prisons and detention centers restricts the scope of market to these companies and their relations with the government: if they have no profits (that can be derived by no means but extremely cheap labor force), they are unable to “honor their contracts with the federal government” (Stevens, n/p). These companies pay 1.26 to 6 percent of minimum wage and a half of 1 percent of what they are supposed to pay under the Service Contract Act (Stevens, n/p). They provide poor working and living conditions for detainees, but also have to maintain contracts for a certain amount of beds. In this case, detention companies seem to be the only party whose interests are preserved. The shortage of state money to provide wage rates required by the contract could be explained either by government’s failure to calculate the optimal number of contract beds or by financial outflow from US taxpayers into private hands.
On the macro level, this situation causes market imbalance. The supply of foreign labor force is adjusted not by the needs of US employers but by government’s contracts with private companies that are supposed to reduce the rates of illegal migration. The mere fact that there is a regular plan that affects the number of detainees violates immigrants’ rights because when the plan is not completed, those people who pose no threat and are likely to win their cases in immigration court are forced to stay and work for these companies.
If the ultimate goal of the US government is to preserve the most contributive immigrants and keep away those who pose a potential threat to the economy, the law-enforcement system based on planning and quotas is not effective. It is indeed an extremely difficult task to determine how the migration inflow would affect economic growth. On the one hand, cheap labor force generates additional incomes for giant companies with higher extent of the division of labor. Illegal labor brings even more profits, so illegal migration corresponds with the interests of most domestic businesses. But the interests of immigrants are violated as well as those of US citizens.
Most cheap labor force comes from rural areas where business activity and employment are unstable and dependent on seasonal factors. Historically, the government was concerned in cheap food for urban population rather than the quality of life of rural population. Such focus of attention dates back to the 1950-70s, the times of Communist thread and Green Revolution. All technological advances in agriculture were intended to prevent hunger in more densely populated urban areas (Patel and Moore 150). As soon as food prices fall, farmers are forced to leave their homes in order to support their families. Seeking employment opportunities in large production facilities abroad, they often have no other choice but to trade their skills, time, and health for an opportunity to earn more than they would at their homeland.
For an American employer, it is an extremely beneficial deal. For an immigrant, it is a matter of life and death for him and his family. Bracero Program is one of the brightest examples of labor exploitation covered by the proclaimed mutual benefit of both Mexican and American governments. In the midst of war, American agriculture demanded cheap and stable workforce. Mexican rural population saw this opportunity as the only salvation from poverty and hunger. The supply far exceeded the demand as the number of guest workers enlisted was 3-4 times greater than employers needed. Legal instruments of migration control proved ineffective: bribery was the most viable way to be enlisted in Mexico, and US employers used every legal or illegal ways to save their costs. On the one hand, the US agriculture prospered because the cheap labor reduced its production costs by 3 to 10 times. Most Mexican workers had an opportunity to acquire US citizenship. On the other hand, such work was indistinguishable from slavery because immigrants had no choice but to stay and accept any wage rate and living conditions they were offered.
In the capitalist world, political democracy is not equal to economic democracy. Companies and agencies that are intended to increase profits and minimize costs have more opportunities to protect their interests on the state level. Interests of American workers are guaranteed by labor unions. Immigrants are the most vulnerable population group because they can rely only on the fairness of the US legislation and law enforcement to protect their rights. There is no agency to advocate their interests in government. In order to preserve the balance of interests and create an optimal condition on the labor market, it is important to build such a policy that would not rely on one particular economic agent.