While Hurricane Katrina was a natural disaster, the issues that exacerbated the problem was delayed aid and rescue efforts because of poor organizational structure and communication problems. The hurricane hit on Sunday, the 29th of August 2005, yet aid from the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) arrived on the Friday long after journalists had already arrived. The paper explores the organizational and communication problems that led to delayed help, turning the disaster into a man-made problem.
Organizational problems
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)
When a disaster is imminent in the United States, it is the responsibility of the State governor to make a request to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), which revises the request, gives suggestions and passes the paperwork to the White House (Morris 2008). When the Department of Homeland Security was formulated in 2003, FEMA became one of the agencies relegated to a new department under DHS. Formerly, FEMA was an independent agency with cabinet representation that answered directly to the President (Gerry et al. 2013, 461). When it was put under the DHS, it lost its authority and autonomy. Its budget was cut by a considerable percentage because the government was keen on fighting terrorism, not responding to natural disasters (Gerry et al.2013,461). For many years since its formation in1979 FEMA had been under poor leadership, for example, Michael Brown who was the head of FEMA when Hurricane Katrina hit was not a professional in disaster management. The agency has also suffered a lot of presidential ambivalence (Morris 2008).
Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
The Department of Homeland Security did not provide the required structures to address the possible challenges of the 21st century tragic hazards (The White House 2005). The system clearly had structural faults for tackling catastrophic occurrences (The White House 2005). During the Federal response to Hurricane Katrina, four critical errors in national vigilance became obvious: the processes for united management of federal response, control and command structures in the federal government, government’s knowledge of its own preparedness plans, and regional coordination and planning (The White House 2005).
Structure
Structure is the main element of success in organizations (Gerry et al. 2013, 431). They can only work well if they are backed by related and other supporting structures. The response to Katrina proved to be a problem, of structure since the Department of Homeland Security, under which FEMA was a department, had a multidivisional instead of a functional structure. Additionally, the National Response Plan (NRP) task process showed to be too bureaucratic to effectively support the response to a calamity (The White House 2005).
The Department of Homeland Security should have been established under a functional, as opposed to a multidivisional structure. It would have allowed for more control and autonomy of each of the departments under it and better knowledge of specialized areas of operation which FEMA really needed during Hurricane Katrina. Additionally, a functional structure would have provided clear definition of roles and responsibilities which would have led to more accountability, and ultimately, efficiency (Gerry et al. 2013, 431-432). Functional departments provide focus and attention to expertise hence cultivating knowledge development in areas of operational and functional specialties (Gerry et al. 2013, 431-432). In that regard, instead of Michael Brown, there would have been an expert professional in disaster management at the helm of FEMA who, with the help of a professional team, would have handled the Katrina response better (Lessons learned from hurricane Katrina 2006).
The problem with the divisional structure at the DHS was that it was extremely independent and self-sufficient (Gerry et al. 2013, 435). Tom Ridge who was the presidential appointee of the centralized government departments declared that ninety-eight percent of his attention was geared towards fighting terrorism (Gerry et al. 2013, 460). As such, FEMA suffered budget cuts and more ambivalence where response to disasters received low priority in favor of possible terror attacks. It would have made more sense to split the government departments into independent departments. In a multi-division, the structure usually hinders knowledge-sharing and cooperation between departments like it was in the DHS (Gerry et al. 2013, 435). Expertise was disintegrated and departmental performance goals gave poor incentives to cooperate with other divisions. The lack of organization at the Federal command post reflected confusing organizational structures at the grassroots (White House 2005).
Alternatively, it should have adopted a project based structure, which is a structure where teams are formed to undertake tasks and once the assignment is complete, the teams are vitiated (Gerry et al. 2013,440). They are very efficient for organizations that deliver large scale services, which in this case would have been efficient to address the Hurricane Katrina tragedy. The project based structure would have had clear tasks, autonomy, a clearly defined time-scale, accountability and control (Gerry et al. 2013,440).
Frameworks and tests
According to the people tests, FEMA and the government failed in the people test because the people available were not coordinated to. The specialized culture tests shows the value of combining specialists so that they can hone their expertise while cooperating with one another (Gerry et al. 2013,442). The DHS scores poorly in this test because specialist structures were not brought together. The flexibility test determines whether the design will adapt efficiently to acclimatize to any future changes (Gerry et al. 2013,443). The Department of Homeland Security did not provide the pertinent structures to tackle the possible challenges of the 21st century tragic hazards, and therefore scored poorly in this test as well (The White House 2005).
McKinsey 7S, the leadership style at DHS and local government was not fit to respond to Hurricane Katrina because it was too bureaucratic.
The staff at FEMA was not well trained considering the leader was not trained in disaster management. He was hired for his loyalty, not his skills.
His skills were also lacking in many ways. When it comes to superordinate goals, the goal of the DHS was to fight terrorism and disaster management was not part of the plan.
His skills were also lacking in many ways. When it comes to super ordinate goals, the goal of the DHS was to fight terrorism and disaster management was not part of the plan.
- Johnson, G., Whittington, R., Scholes, K., Angwin, D. and RegnŽr, P., 2013. Exploring strategy text & cases. Pearson Higher Ed.
- Lessons learned from hurricane Katrina: preparing your institution for a catastrophic event. Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, 2006.
- Morris, J.C., 2008. From Disaster to Lessons Learned: What Went Wrong in the Response to Hurricane Katrina? Old Dominion University’s Quest 11(1).
- The White House 2005, Lessons Learned.
