Guided by managerial accountability precept Woolsey would have to take up the role of the executive rather than the judge; thus, firing the CIA officers named in the inspector general’s report such as the DO Ted as it would require he show authority by demanding responsibility of Aldrich Ames’ actions. From the disappointment of his fellow CIA officers who expected him to fire people who had neglected their jobs hence allowing Ames to leak CIA documents to the Soviet Union.
The Senate intelligence committee regarded Woolsey actions against the named officers a slap on the wrist that should not have been the case was he acting more to his managerial duties. In as much as some of the officers had Ames serve under them for short periods of time it is not an excuse for an excuse for negligence on their behalf or not pursuing his case due to too much bureaucracy. The extravagant spending by Ames should have easily been noted by the CIA audits as Ames did nothing to hide it from expensive cars and house.
It, therefore, means someone was not doing their work and should have to be not only just reprimanded but also fired. More so was the sleeping at work and drinking at job where accuracy and efficiency are expected at its peak should not have gone unpunished at the very least. While the structures put by the CIA to manage such issues were not only inefficient, they allowed Ames to get away even after the reporting made by a colleague.
In some percepts, the officer’s negligence that allowed Ames to sell state secrets is responsible even if indirectly for the CIA assets in Russia that were killed by the KGB making them susceptible to negligence murder. Woolsey should not only have targeted the officers in charge of Ames, but also remade the structures that allowed for the leak. While trying not to repeat his predecessors’ mistake and launching a witch hunt, a witch hunt was exactly what the CIA needed at that time. to answer ultimately would have been Not only for public show but also to restructure the managerial and accountability systems set up then and keep the CIA on alert. Woolsey should have acted as the prosecutor as he was demanded and dismantle the “old boy” set up at the CIA that by different reasons made it possible for one of CIAs biggest leak in history and for that heads should have rolled as expected.
The structural aspects applied by Woolsey in solving the case involving Ames, Woolsey was prudent to realize that following the pressure exerted by the Congress would bring about dent his managerial judgment skills. The Congress passed on ‘letting heads role’, so as to silent the critics. Woolsey on the other hand had just got into serving his tenure as CIA boss, and the case of Ames had not transpired under his regime. Still it did not stop the Congress namely Senator DeConcini, chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee in questioning if the use of intelligence was actually needed like in the 80s, moreover some questioned the need for the CIA. Some critics wanted those who were responsible for Ames to answer too; this would mean a lot of people losing their jobs or to the extremely infamous ‘let heads roll’.
The CIA was now in its late 40s, and many would argue suffering from its mid-life crisis. Woolsey, although at the top, was to ultimately answer for the actions of his operatives meant he was responsible for his agents. Thus meaning that all the senior officers at the time although serving the retirement were still answerable. In the report handed in by Inspector General Hitz, he had named a list of 23 people who he thought were answerable for actions of Ames. In the list, Woolsey was able to seclude some who he thought were more accountable. This is because if he were to include all of them even those in retirement no gain would come to the agency just to him in order to seem accountable. He was going to use those officers as ‘scape goats. Recalling what the actions of Ames had brought about, he was obliged to act fast and in good judgment for there was no room for errors. The case of Ames was not long gone as he had thought, as some people still questioned the agency.
Culturally, Woolsey was able to avoid backlash from the society, as his actions were that of sheer prudence and accountability. He was able to change what in the society would mean a real case of unaccountability by managers in relation to public relations in a workplace. Most managers do not want to account for any incidences that may occur in a given organization. I f the ultimate result would mean getting people fired then they would gladly do it, to ensure they would survive.
Although Woolsey handed in his resignation letter to Clinton, he proudly felt that he had tackled the situation the best way he knew how. Clinton accepted his resignation although with a heavy heart. His actions may have spurred a nationwide debate on whether he had changed the cultural views of the people in the society.
Managers should be utterly answerable to any poor performance in an organization. Managers as the name suggests depicts that they have the sole aim to manage all actions taken in the organization. To be responsible for the positive and negative actions taken by members of the organization that brings about public limelight to them. He should be able to provide answers to the questions raised about the organization, to be able to defend the views of the institution. Failure to this reveals that the manager is unable to perform his job. Thus is susceptible to the same treatment as of those he is responsible for this may include sack, forceful retirement or probing
