I agree with the perception of India having a significant influence on Asia’s future security landscape, while Southeast Asia has negligible influence over their future security landscape. This is because India is a key participant in the Asian-Pacific zone balance of power alongside the United States (U.S), Japan, and China. As indicated in Kaplan (2009), according to the U.S National Intelligence Council Report, by 2012, the world will have to deal with the economic, military, and political scope of the rise of India and China. This release related the 21st-century Indian revolution to the 19th century one in Germany, and the U.S in the 20th century, with the outcome conceivably as dramatic. Therefore, it is crucial to highlight the collaborations and importance of India in the adjustment of security architecture in the coming years in the Pacific-Asia, particularly in Southeast Asia region.

According to Kaplan (2009), the Central Intelligence Authority (CIA) branded India as the swing state in universal politics and forecasted that by 2015, India would arise as the fourth most significant jurisdiction in the global system. Moreover, the most significant relationship for the future of Southeast Asia will seemingly be Sino-India ties. The mutual relationship between India and China has actually prolonged since the outcome of India’s nuclear test in 1998. Nevertheless, as argued by Malone and Mukherjee (2010), nine years later, the connection between the two nations seemed to be notably improving, especially by the Indian prime minister visited China in 2003. Additionally, the two jurisdictions appointed special representatives to catalyze border negotiations for more than two decades. Additionally, India founded some convergence of interest alongside China. Malone and Mukherjee (2010) also posit that both countries shared identical concerns over the growth of global dominance of the U.S, which they perceived as the threat for fundamentalist ethnic and religious movements as terrorists and the need to prioritize economic advancement in the region. Furthermore, India expressed its concerns about the U.S’ application of its military muscles around the globe. Hence, India was publicly antagonistic to the war in Iraq.

Malone and Mukherjee (2010) indicate that India’s enthusiasm as a major power in the Pacific has escalated in the recent past in conformity with the advancement in its economic and military capacity. Furthermore, India’s foreign policy towards Southeast Asia and the entire Pacific is also aligning in conformity with the advancement of these influences. Also, as China remains to be the key player whose emergence is significantly influencing the security dynamics in the Asian-Pacific, India has been trying to assess its relationship with China. Additionally, India’s policy in the Asia-Pacific has been driven by the motive of abridging the influence of China and establishing itself as a key player.

Further, India has been earnestly intriguing other nations in the region of Southeast Asia. In fact, Kaplan (2009) records that India’s relationships with Southeast Asia was largely boosted when India propounded its Look East Policy in 1991, which in multiple ways became a strategic shift in India’s vision of the universe. Consequently, in 2005, India’s trade with Southeast Asia jurisdictions hit a high of $23 billion, which was a significant improvement compared to 1990’s $2.4 billion. In addition, Jones and Smith (2007) are of the view that Southeast Asia jurisdictions have also been pursuing to cope up with the emergence of India in their proximity. By and large, India-Japan, Sino-India, and U.S-India connections had been stirring to the middle of the Southeast Asia equation. Importantly, for the majority of the Southeast Asia nations are currently perceiving India as a key balancer in the zone.

Importantly, as seen in Kaplan (2009), the U.S has been considering India as a significant partner in boosting security partnership to deter maritime threats in the Indian Ocean, conducting research and rescue missions, boosting harmonious capacities via logistic backing, responding to natural calamities, and deterring piracy. Again, the Indian navy was expected to take significant roles in the collaborative effort in protecting the security of Indian Ocean and whole of Southeast Asia. Moreover, the latest Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR) made a significantly strong statement of India’s relevance for the U.S in the emerging international security framework. According to Kaplan (2009), despite notable concerns with the Chinese advancing military capacity throughout the QDR, India’s was largely highlighted, and its importance was attached to its advancing global profile. In these reports, India was described as a strong emerging power and a crucial strategic associate of the U.S. The QDR stated categorically that adjacent collaboration with India in the fight against terrorism, efforts in countering weapons of mass destruction (WMD) conception, and additional non-traditional threats necessitated its alliance with the U.S and aided in improving their capabilities.

Finally, India’s Pacific foreign policy has been aimed at containing China’s influence and positioning itself as a key player. Towards this motive, India has been greatly aided by the U.S and Japan with whom it has been sharing many interests and values in the Pacific region. Furthermore, India has been hindering the emergence of additional leading powers in Southeast Asia, particularly between Aden and Singapore. While it may be challenging for India to block the evolution of China owing to its capacities, it has been certainly trying to hinder China from becoming a complete sway in the zone. Therefore, India has been seeking to reduce the power discrepancy with China and establish better stability in Asia through strategic ties with other jurisdictions such as the U.S and Japan. Moreover, Japanese and the U.S concerns have significantly assembled with the Indian concerns in adjusting the security architecture in the Pacific and especially in the Southeast Asia jurisdiction in the coming years. It will be great to see how these relations will shape the politics and economic development in the region.