This paper explores the question of whether competition and equality play roles in the preservation of liberty, or if both are mutually exclusive. In attempting to do so, this work uses the works of James Fennimore Cooper and Kurt Vonnegut. While a knee-jerk response would make it seem as though the answer is clear, or clear-cut, the question is far too compelling and requires more than a bit of nuance. In fact, the position of this paper is it is necessary to use inferences to explore whether, or not, competition and equality are important to liberty, and if both exclude one another.

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Reading Cooper, the inference is that competition is embedded within equality, but is exclusively reserved for white males. The challenge to addressing the question by reading Vonnegut has to do with his use of the extreme, his vision of a dystopian society bent on leveling the playing field, so to speak, making all people equal no matter the cost. Hence, this paper is left to conclude that the very concepts relating to competition, equality and liberty are not clear, yet in one manner or another are either limited by virtue of gender, age and race or, in a converse manner, are utilized in a manner that, at the least, constricts liberty.

To address the question related to competition, equality and the preservation of liberty it is necessary, for this specific exercise, to deal with inferences. When considering “Equality and Liberty,” written by James Fennimore Cooper then the inference would be somewhat in the affirmative, competition and equality play a role in liberty and they are not mutually exclusive. However, in Kurt Vonnegut’s “Harrison Bergeron” competition and equality appear to play no part in the preservation of liberty, and they are mutually exclusive.

The rationale for such a response begins with Cooper, however it should be noted that nowhere in his treatise does he refer to the notion of competition. Hence, it is necessary to understand his views on matters pertaining to political and civil rights in order to identify the inference because in his estimation liberty is actually not based upon equality, but actually is predicated on a number of elements pertaining to economic status, gender, age and race. However, with no reference to the role of competition it is left to infer that it is embedded in Cooper’s notions pertaining to equality and, in turn, preserves liberty in as much as it appears only to be extended to white males.

If the Cooper inference that competition is a part of equality is acceptable then it perhaps also must be accepted that liberty is more of a construct pertaining to civil and political rights, which Cooper argues implies “…mere equality before the administration of the law, the other, equality in the power to frame it.” (184) Again, when it comes to such terms as equality and rights all things are not created equally. To Cooper the question pertaining to the equality of civil rights is only extended to white people, but is apportioned in terms of gender and age. In other words, Cooper admits the concept is not absolute and then discusses why wives and minors do not share in the bounty of equality afforded through civil rights for white males. Secondly, the extension of political rights is also only afforded to white males, as Cooper argues that women, minors, the poor and slaves have no such rights (185). It is then left to inference, because with so many excluded from the table of equality and rights then competition appears also to only be within the purview of white male privilege.

In “Harrison Bergeron” it is inferred that competition and equality are mutually exclusive, which leads to the conclusion that there is no liberty to preserve. Vonnegut paints a bleak picture of the future (if the backdrop is indeed so), as the state has imposed constrictive sanctions in order to carve out a nation strictly based on the notion of equality. Those who have no outstanding abilities to compete, such as Hazel, are not viewed by the state as having an advantage of others. But, her husband George is forced to wear a buzzer in his ear to prevent him from thinking constructively as well as a heavy bag of birdshot that would seem to indicate his being equal to Hazel in some fashion (Vonnegut 7-9) Hazel suggests that George rid the bag of some of the birdshot in order to lighten his burden yet doing so would be a threat to George’s freedom—he would be fined and arrested. Vonnegut has constructed a dystopian vision that is fraught with implications.

Competition in his vision is viewed in terms of digression, something that occurred in history, “…we’d be right back to the dark ages again, with everybody competing against everybody else.” (9) In this dystopian vision, competition is a threat to both equality and liberty as people in this society are forced to become artificially handicapped in order that all become equal. The actions of the title character, Harrison, makes this clear, “…he just escaped from jail, where he was held on suspicion of plotting to overthrow the government. He is a genius and an athlete, is under-handicapped, and should be regarded as extremely dangerous.” (Vonnegut 10) The attributes of Harrison were indeed a danger to this society, but while equality was the imperative there was no liberty.

This paper explored the works of James Fennimore Cooper and Kurt Vonnegut in order to address the question of competition, equality and how both may have a part in the preservation of liberty. The response, as it may be, is found in inferences. To Cooper, it may be understood that competition is embedded within equality but that it is only fully extended to white males. From this view, all concepts are constructs reserved for those fortunate enough to have been born with the correct attributes pertaining to gender, age and race. In the dystopian vision of Vonnegut it is inferred that equality and competition are mutually exclusive and, constructed by the author, are a threat to liberties. However, being forced into an unnatural state of equality virtually eliminates liberty as may currently be understood. The nature of competition, where individuals are pitted against each other, seems almost to be opposite of equality. But, without the means to freely express individual attributes then there can be no liberty. This may only be tenable when all are afforded civil and political rights, and not within a framework that only reserves both based upon looks or status.