According to J. L. Mackie (1955), the problem of evil can only be posed to believers in a God who is omnipotent and wholly good. It involves answering questions that, from the perspective of Mackie, cannot be resolved. Basically, the problem of evil challenges the belief that God is omnipotent and wholly (or perfectly) good, for which Mackie finds to be contradictory. From his view, if two of the statements are true, then one is false. Essentially, if God is omnipotent and perfectly good, then evil cannot exist. Good things negate evil and, as Mackie notes, no limitations cannot be placed on omnipotence.
The freewill solution references the fact that God is not the author of evil, but that humans are. This occurs as a result of God providing humans with the freedom of will. Mackie provides a sort-of equation demonstrating the freewill solution which essentially proposes that first order evil, for example pain, is justified as logically necessary for second order good (Mackie provides sympathy as an example). This would seem to be a cause-and-effect relationship where the evil of pain garners a sympathetic response, which appears to be a second order good. But a second order evil, for example cruelty, cannot be justified as had the previous example. To Mackie, cruelty is attributed to humans and God cannot be held accountable for it. Before proceeding further, it is important to explore what is meant by the first and second order goods and evils, which is needed to better understand what Mackie is driving at.

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First and second order goods and evils relate to a relationship between the two, because one does not exist without the other. This is what Mackie points out as being the first solution to the problem of evil that basically argues that in order to know good humans must also know evil. Mackie refers to this as the “first order solution,” for which he dismisses for various reasons but perhaps most important of all is that the first order solution places limitations on what God can do. Mackie also argues that a universe with some evil is necessary for there to be good. He views evil in this sense as contributing to universal good, that the world is better because of the existence of evil. This view is Mackie’s “second order solution” to the problem of evil, for which he also disputes. He raises the issue of fatal objection, by which he means if first order evils, such as pain, require second order goods like sympathy, then second order evils, for example indifference, will require third order goods. This sets up the notion of third order evils requiring fourth order goods. Mackie sees this as highly implausible, because the problem of evil cannot ever be logically resolved.

This leaves the free will solution which basically skips first and second order goods and evils, and places the existence of evil squarely on the shoulders of humans. But to Mackie, the most obvious flaw in this solution is the fact that not all evil can be attributed to humans or free will. There is nature to contend with, and natural disasters as well as diseases are sometimes seen as evils. Mackie also points to a “Paradox of Omnipotence,” where he asks whether an omnipotent being can author things for which he cannot control. No matter if the answer is “yes” or “no,” God is caught in a double-bind because both answers point to the notion that God is not, and has never been, omnipotent.

From the standpoint of logic there does not appear to be other solutions to the problem of evil that would be tenable. However, Beebe (n.d.) reports that one such solution proposes that the existence of evil is necessary in order to bring about human salvation. While evil was first introduced into the world by Adam, it is God who uses both natural and moral acts of evil as a form of providence as ways in which humans, who have fallen, may return to the fold.

    References
  • Beebe, J. R. (n.d.). Logical problem of evil. Retrieved May 24, 2016, from http://www.iep.utm.edu/evil-log/#H9
  • Mackie, J. L. (1955). Evil and omnipotence. Mind, 64(254), 200-212. Retrieved from http://www.ditext.com/mackie/evil.html