In this essay, I will argue that, while there are considerable difficulties concerning the moral evaluation of actions or events that affect future generations of people, it is nevertheless the case that in the example discussed there is harm and moral wrongdoing. In the case to be considered the Canadian government creates a policy that encourages the mining and use of coal and discourages attempts to create renewable energy sources. Coal production increases immediately. However, coal companies dump waste into streams and, as a result, thousands of people die in the year 2267. The challenge for me is to explain why this is morally wrong, or why harm is done.
The case does not specify whether the government could or should have foreseen the danger in encouraging the use of coal. If it could or should have foreseen this, then (I will argue) it is morally culpable. If it could not have foreseen it, then the question of morality shifts to the coal companies. To simplify the discussion, I will henceforth speak merely of whether there was wrongdoing or harm done without specifying who might be at fault.
(a) It is straightforward to make at least a plausible case for the thesis that harm is done to the people in the year 2267. If the waste had not been dumped into the stream those thousands of people would not have died at the future date. Slightly more technically, we can say that an action x harms a person S just in case, if x had not occurred, S would have been better off. The people who die in the future as a result of the waste dumping would have been better off had it not occurred because they would not have died. It seems clear, therefore, that the actions in question harm, or will harm, the people in the year 2267.
While there are potential counterexamples to the principle concerning harm formulated in the previous paragraph they do not seem to be relevant to the present issues. The possible counterexamples tend to be rather fanciful. Suppose, for example, that a person is harmed in a relatively minor way. Say that person A is struck by person B, with the result that the former has to go to the hospital. While being treated for the minor injury person A meets the love of his or her life.
(b) However, there are difficulties in the notion of harming people who do not now exist. As Parfit points out one view is that moral principles apply only to individuals who are in a position to reciprocate. It applies, that is to say, only to people who can themselves cause benefit or harm. Since the people in the year 2267 do not now exist, they cannot cause harm or benefit themselves. On this view, therefore, there is no moral wrongdoing since there is no possibility of reciprocation. Parfit rejects this view and he seems correct to do so. A more important challenge to the thesis of the paper is that there are questions of personal identity to consider. As Parfit also points out, very slight changes in the circumstances of a person’s conception, parentage, or birth can affect his or her identity. We cannot rule out the possibility that, as a result of the waste being dumped into the stream, people will later exist who would not otherwise have existed. If these people have good lives, or lives worth living, then this fact must be included in our assessment of whether the waste dumping harms future people to such an extent that it ought to be considered morally wrong. One might argue that it is simply indeterminate whether harm is done to the future people because we have no way of knowing whether the overall consequences—in terms of the happiness of the people who come to exist, perhaps in part because of the waste dumping—are worse because of the waste dumping.
Parfit does not provide reasons for rejecting the reciprocation thesis. Yet such reasons are not difficult to find. There are many possible situations in which moral wrongdoing is not accompanied by the possibility of reciprocation. To give just one example, a woman who drinks heavily or takes dangerous illegal drugs (or a partner who encourages her to do so) is acting wrongly despite the fact that, at least at the very early stages of the pregnancy, there is no person being harmed. There is no possibility of reciprocation.
(c) It is certainly plausible that actions or events can affect whether a person later comes into existence and that it is difficult or impossible for us to know whether or when this happens. However, in the case described we have limited information. We know only that thousands of people die as a result of the waste dumping. Using the definition, set out above, of what it means to harm someone, it seems clear that the waste dumping does harm these future people. Since this is all we know about the case I think it is clear that harm is done to the future people in question. If more details were added to the case my verdict might change. However, it is not good philosophical or ethical practice to suspend judgment simply on the basis of possible (but unknown) future contingencies. One way to express my conclusion, therefore, is to say that other things equal we should judge that the actions of the government or the coal companies do harm the future people in question.
An additional relevant consideration is that once one begins to ask questions about possible future consequences of actions—especially questions that concern a person coming, or failing to come, into existence, theorizing of any sort becomes very difficult. This is because the questions raise a host of issues that there are no clear means of settling. This is one reason that examples in ethical theory tend to be relatively simple. For the more factors they concern, the more difficult and complex the evaluation procedure becomes.
(d) Now, it could be objected that we simply do not have enough information concerning who will be born, who will live a good life, and so forth, in order to make a moral judgment based upon harm. As intimated earlier, for all we know it might be the case that the waste dumping will have better overall consequences—despite the fact that the thousands of people are going to be harmed through being killed. However, this objection fails to take account of the “other things equal” clause in my verdict. Obviously, it is true that if the details of the case were altered our judgment might be altered as well; but all we have to go on is the case as it is described. Given this description, then it seems clearly to follow that there is harm done to the future people in question. It does not follow from the fact that other considerations, for example concerning who might and might not come into existence as a result of an act, might become relevant, or that the case could be described in a different way, that our judgment about the case as described is incorrect, or unwarranted.
Now, this admittedly does assume the rejection of the harm principle formulated in section (a) above. Furthermore, it was admitted in that section that the harm principle has potential counterexamples. However, the reasoning in that section remains at least arguably compelling. If one were to stop and ponder even a small sampling of the possible consequences of each potentially morally significant action one undertakes then moral deliberation and action would be impossible.
In conclusion, this paper has discussed some ethical difficulties that surround the notions of harm and future existence. It discusses a plausible criterion for when harm has been done, and exhibits a potential problem this causes with the idea of present actions that will affect people who have not yet been born. A hypothetical case involving the Canadian government is briefly discussed, as are some of Derek Parfit’s views on harm and future existence. Finally, the paper defends the intuitive thesis that harm can be done to future generations and that inflicting this harm can be morally wrong.
- Parfit, D. (1982). Future generations: Further problems. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 11(2), 113-172.
